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The Political Offense Exception and the
Extradition Process: The Enhancement
of the Role of the U.S. Judiciary*
By ABRAHAM ABRAMOVSKY**
"Until [there is] a reformation of the criminal codes of most nations,
to deliver fugitives from them would be to become their accomplice."'
Thomas Jefferson, 1793
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a corner of the United Kingdom, a presumed crucible of democ-
racy and civility, lies Northern Ireland, a land ridden with political and
religious differences, social unrest, violence, and hate. Although commu-
nal strife is not a recent phenomenon in what is now Northern Ireland,
the latest round of civil unrest and sectarian violence began in 1968.
Britain responded to the re-emergence of violence and paramilitary orga-
nizations2 by augmenting the restrictive legislation already in effect in
Northern Ireland. The result of this action has been the sacrifice of indi-
vidual rights.
This Article first discusses the conflict in Northern Ireland, focusing
on trial procedures. Then, the extradition procedures in the United States
and the political offense exception are examined.
Using the present situation in Northern Ireland as a model, this Ar-
ticle argues that political dissidents have not received fair trials in certain
countries requesting extradition as a result of their extant criminal justice
systems. Thus, the United States judiciary should exercise a uniform
method to inquire into the criminal justice systems of those countries
before the judiciary extradites an individual, especially when the political
offense exception is invoked. The courtroom provides the isolated envi-
ronment, free from diplomatic considerations, which delicate decisions
such as extradition requests necessitate. To achieve the appropriate bal-
ance between an individual's right to political dissent and the United
States interest in not becoming a haven for alleged perpetrators of hei-
nous crimes, the inquiry must be uniform.
II. CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE
EMERGENCY LEGISLATION
A. Historical Background
The Protestant-Catholic feuds and fighting have characterized Irish
history for centuries. On July 12, 1690, "Prince William of Orange
emerged victorious over the forces of the deposed Catholic monarch,
2. The most well-known of the paramilitary organizations is the Irish Republican Army
(IRA). Connely, Political Violence and International Law: The Case of Northern Ireland, 16
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 79 n. 1(1987). The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) is the
armed branch of the IRA. Id. The PIRA is the largest organized grouping of a military
character to promote the Nationalist cause of Northern Ireland; loyalists also employ groups
which use force to maintain Northern Ireland's link with Britain. Id. at 87.
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James II." The present political conflict, although hardly removable
from the religious strife, began to take shape with the Act of Union of
1800, which formally incorporated Ireland into the United Kingdom.4
At the outbreak of World War I, when the British Parliament at
Westminster seemed ready to grant home-rule to Ireland, the Ulster
Protestants of the north demanded special treatment.' "In 1920, Parlia-
ment sought a solution of sorts through the Government of Ireland Act,
which provided two home-rule parliaments, one for the 26 counties of
the south and one for the six counties of the north."6 Although the south
was recognized as completely free of Britain in 1949, 7 British rule in
Northern Ireland remained unchanged. The rule of the Northern Ire-
land Parliament, established in 1922 and later dubbed "Stormont" for
the parliament building it occupied in Belfast, can be characterized as
sectarian and replete with anti-Catholic discrimination in employment,
housing, and education.' Thus arose the tradition of tension in Northern
Ireland between the Catholic minority and the Protestant majority.
B. Current History
Although the current bout of terrorist intimidation and violence
dates back to 1968, 9 the events that resulted in the current legislative
enactments occurred in 1972. The most infamous of these events was
"Bloody Sunday," during which British armed forces in Londonderry
killed thirteen Catholic demonstrators exercising civil disobedience.10 In
1972, a record 500 deaths were attributed to Nationalist forces.II Britain
first responded in March of that year by imposing direct rule from West-
minster.12 The Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1972
3. Hellerstein, McKay, & Schlam, Criminal Justice and Human Rights in Northern Ire-
land, 43 RECORD A. B. N.Y. 110, 115-16 (1988) [hereinafter Hellerstein].
4. Id. at 116-17.
5. Id. at 117.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.; see also Lowry, Legislation in a Social Vacuum: The Failure of the Fair Employ-
ment (Northern Ireland) Act, 1976 and Alternative Solutions, 9 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 345
(1977), for an analysis of the discrimination in employment against the Catholic minority in
Northern Ireland. For a useful historical chronicle of anti-Catholic discrimination and Protes-
tant privilege in Northern Ireland, see G. Bell, THE PROTESTANTS OF ULSTER (1976); J.
Darby, CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1976); M. Farrell, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE
ORANGE STATE (1976).
9. Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 120-21. Since 1969, nearly 3,000 individuals have been
killed as a result of political violence in Northern Ireland. Id. at 115.
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suspended the Stormont Parliament, and the Northern Ireland Constitu-
tion Act of 1973 abolished the Stormont Parliament altogether.' 3
The evolution of the statutory framework that exists in Northern
Ireland today has directly affected the criminal justice system. When the
British Parliament suspended the Northern Ireland Parliament in 1972
and imposed direct rule from Westminster, it established a Commission,
chaired by Lord Diplock, to consider a more effective manner to prose-
cute persons involved in alleged terrorist organizations and activities.
The result was the Diplock Report, 4 which recommended a number of
significant departures from the traditional criminal procedures that had
been practiced in both England and Northern Ireland.
The Commission focused on three major problems that British au-
thorities had encountered in securing the convictions of suspected ter-
rorists under "ordinary" criminal procedures. 15 First, the Director of
Public Prosecution had abandoned a number of prosecutions in 1972 on
the ground that confessions obtained during prolonged interrogation
were involuntary and, hence, inadmissible.' 6 The Commission, there-
fore, recommended the application of a lower standard governing the
admissibility of confessions.' 7 Second, there was a concern about the
possible intimidation of jurors and witnesses in trials relating to terrorist
offenses.'" Third, there was a risk of partisan or perverse verdicts ema-
nating from biased Northern Irish juries. 'I To eliminate these last two
problems, the Commission recommended suspension of trial by jury for
certain "scheduled offenses."2 Parliament enacted the vast majority of
the Diplock Commission's recommendations in the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act of 1973, which was reenacted without sig-
nificant changes in 1978.21
On April 8, 1983, the Rt. Honourable Sir George Baker was ap-
13. Id.
14. Lord Diplock first reported in 1972 on the security system in Northern Ireland. Id. at
122.
15. HOUSE OF COMMONS AND COMMAND, COMMISSION TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCE-
DURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1972-1973, CMND.
No. 5185, paras. 17, 35-38, 73-92 [hereinafter Diplock Report].
16. K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN, & P. HILLYARD, TEN YEARS ON IN NORTHERN IRELAND:
THE LEGAL CONTROL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 38 (1980) [hereinafter K. BOYLE].
17. Diplock Report, supra note 15, para. 89. A confession would be deemed admissible
provided it was not shown to have been obtained by subjecting the accused to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment. Id.
18. Id. para. 36; K. BOYLE, supra note 16, at 57.
19. Diplock Report, supra note 15, para. 37.
20. Id. paras. 35-38.
21. Hellerstein, supra note 3, at 147.
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pointed to examine the operation of the Diplock courts to determine
their efficacy.22 Commenting on specific changes, the Baker Report
stated that "despite admitted improvement in the security situation, the
reasonably foreseeable incidence of terrorist crime is such that there is
little room for manoeuvre in making changes in the act."23
Nevertheless, Parliament amended the 1978 Act regarding the func-
tioning of the Diplock courts. The amendments were incorporated in the
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1987. First, in bail ap-
plication, the 1987 Act shifted the burden in scheduled cases from the
defense to the prosecution. Second, the Act enabled the Lord Chancel-
lor, after consultation with the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland,
to direct that a particular trial of a scheduled offense be held at the
Crown Court sitting outside Belfast. Finally, the Act deemed statements
inadmissible if secured from the accused while subjected to violence or
the threat of violence and codified, in declaratory form, judicial discre-
tion to exclude statements in the interest of justice.24
Although the 1987 Act appears to grant further rights to defendants
in Northern Ireland, the system remains inherently unfair. Suspected
terrorists still do not receive a fair trial in Northern Ireland because of
the emergency legislation. The risk still exists that suspects will be perse-
cuted by the British government.25 It is this author's contention that the
United States judiciary can no longer ignore this factor in determining
whether the acts of an Irish Republican Army (IRA) or a Provisional
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) member's acts fall within the political
offense exception to the extradition treaty between the United States and
the United Kingdom. The criminal justice system to which he or she will
be subjected is dependent upon, and thus inseparable from, the status as
an alleged perpetrator of a violent political act.
C. Lack of a Fair Trial for Alleged Terrorists in Northern Ireland
Under the Emergency Provision Act [hereinafter EPA], 26 the proce-
22. Id. at 151.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 155.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 36-46. See generally, Lowry, Ill Treatment, Brutal-
ity and Torture: Some Thoughts Upon the "Treatment" of Irish Political Prisoners, 22 DE
PAUL L. REV. 553 (1973); Lowry, European Convention and Human Rights in Northern Ire-
land, K.Y. CASE W. RES. J. INT'L 251 (1978); Lowry, Terrorism and Human Rights:
Counter-Insurgency and Necessity at Common Law, 53 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 49 (1977).
26. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1987, ch. 1987 c 30 [hereinafter EPA],
reprinted in D HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND VALES, at 31 Northern Ireland 1
(4th ed. 1988).
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dural rights of an accused terrorist in Northern Ireland are severely cur-
tailed. The primary effect of the emergency legislation is to allow a wide
variety of scheduled offenses commonly committed by members of ter-
rorist organizations to be tried in the Diplock courts by a single judge
without a jury.2 7 Furthermore, amended rules of evidence allow for ad-
mitting confessions obtained by any means short of "torture, inhuman,
or degrading treatment."28 Thus, the traditional rights and safeguards
granted to "ordinary" criminal defendants are denied to suspected ter-
rorists under this legislation.
From the moment charges are brought against a defendant for a
scheduled offense related to an act of terrorism,29 the case is channelled
through the Diplock court system, with all its inherent flaws and abuses.
At this point, the police charge the accused with the most serious crimes
in regard to a particular incident in order to strengthen the prosecution's
hand during plea-bargaining.3" In addition, bail is not granted in such
cases except upon the prosecution's separate application to a High Court
judge.31
At the committal stage, when the prosecution presents its evidence
to the magistrate, the EPA requires the proceedings for scheduled of-
fenses to be in the form of a preliminary inquiry, 2 which consists of
written depositions, rather than in the traditional form of preliminary
investigation consisting of a full oral hearing. The accused's right to
challenge the prosecution's case through cross-examination, an essential
27. See EPA, supra note 26, § 7(l), (2), reprinted in 31 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENG-
LAND AND WALES, supra note 26, at 433 (4th ed. 1987); D. WALSH, THE USE AND ABUSE OF
EMERGENCY LEGISLATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND 96 (1983). "Scheduled" offenses include
murder, manslaughter, riot, kidnapping, false imprisonment and assault. EPA, supra note 26,
sched. 4, §§ 1-6, reprinted in 31 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra
note 26, at 458 (4th ed. 1987).
28. EPA, supra note 26, § 5(2)(b), reprinted in D HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND
AND WALES, supra note 26, at 31 Northern Ireland 18.
29. "Ordinary" criminals charged with scheduled offenses are also processed through the
Diplock courts. For example, ordinary robbery accompanied by the use of a weapon is a
scheduled offense and cannot be descheduled. EPA, supra note 26, sched. 4 n.4, reprinted in
31 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 26, at 461 (4th ed. 1987). It
is suggested that as much as 40% of the cases being heard in the Diplock courts are ordinary
criminal cases. D. WALSH, supra note 27, at 60.
30. D. WALSH, supra note 27, at 80-81.
31. EPA, supra note 26, § l(1)(a), (b), reprinted in D HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENG-
LAND AND WALES, supra note 26, at 31 Northern Ireland 12.
32. See EPA supra note 26, § 1(1), reprinted in D HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND
AND WALES, supra note 26, at 31 Northern Ireland 12. Although a magistrate may hold an
oral hearing if it is necessary in the interests of justice, this provision has been interpreted to
restrict oral hearings to cases in which there is disputed evidence on matters such as identifica-
tion. See K. BOYLE, supra note 16, at 69.
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part of the adversarial system of criminal justice, is thus eliminated at
this stage.33
Proceeding by preliminary inquiry can also result in evidentiary
problems. If the written testimony contains inadmissible evidence, such
as references to a prior criminal record that is not eradicated at the com-
mittal stage, the evidence will be seen by the trial judge, who is the final
arbiter of fact in a Diplock court.34 The ultimate decision of guilt or
innocence could be swayed by such evidence, resulting in extreme preju-
dice to the accused at the actual trial.
One of the major injustices of the Diplock system is the admissibility
of uncorroborated accomplice testimony ("supergrass" testimony). A
supergrass is an informant, usually a defendant also arrested for Diplock
offenses, who turns state's witness to lower his own sentence.35 Thus, he
is often a combined informant and accomplice. In many cases, the testi-
mony of a single, uncorroborated supergrass is the prosecution's only
evidence against the accused. 6 Yet, that evidence alone can sustain a
conviction in a Diplock court.37 In addition, the evidence of an alleged
accomplice and informer is notoriously unreliable because of the strong
incentive for a supergrass to wrongly implicate other persons to secure
favorable treatment.38 One pretrial strategy adopted by the prosecution
whose only evidence is the testimony of a supergrass is to obtain a volun-
tary bill of indictment, which can be obtained by ex parte application. If
accepted, the bill circumvents the need for a committal proceeding in
which the case might be dropped due to insufficient evidence. 39
Although the voluntary bill of indictment procedure is not a feature of
the emergency legislation, its use in cases of scheduled offenses effectively
shields supergrass testimony from cross-examination at the committal
stage.' The inevitable result is that the accused remains in custody
based on questionable evidence. Due to the ex parte nature of the proce-
dure, the accused has no opportunity to confront inadmissible prejudicial
statements that may be used at the subsequent trial.41
The absence of a jury trial in the Diplock courts gives rise to many
33. K. BOYLE, supra note 16, at 69.
34. EPA, supra note 26, § 7(1), (2), reprinted in 31 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND
AND WALES, supra note 26, at 433 (4th ed. 1987).
35. D. WALSH, supra note 27, at 90-92.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 100.
38. Id. at 91.
39. Id. at 88-89.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 90.
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implications of unfairness. The Commission's recommendation of trial
without jury for terrorist offenses was based on the dual concern of possi-
ble intimidation of jurors and possible juror bias.42 Although these justi-
fications initially may sound reasonable, they actually deny a defendant a
jury of peers and the ordinary procedural safeguards afforded nonter-
rorist defendants.
One major drawback of the nonjury trials in the Diplock courts is
that the judge is the ultimate arbiter of both fact and law and, as such,
must hear all evidence, whether admissible or not. For example, if it
appears that a confession was wrongfully extracted from the accused, the
judge faces the nearly impossible task of ignoring this fact in making a
determination. Although section 8(2)(b)(iii) of the EPA attempts to
avoid injustice in this situation by granting the judge discretion to direct
that the trial continue in a differently constituted court and the evidence
omitted, this section is rarely invoked.43
Finally, an inherent unfairness of nonjury trials is a phenomenon
known as case hardening.' As the Diplock judges repeatedly hear the
same type of evidence in the same terrorism-related cases, they tend to
favor the police version of the incident. This ultimately results in a de-
creased rate of acquittals.4 5 A randomly selected jury facing these issues
for the first time would be able to give a fairer hearing to each case.
III. THE EXTRADITION PROCEDURE
IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Historical Background
Until 1842, the United States was reluctant to enter into extradition
agreements. This reluctance arose out of the fear that any threat of ex-
tradition might impede the flow of immigrants to the newly established
republic.4 6 In addition, Americans mistrusted monarchical regimes and
believed that their new nation stood as a refuge for persons in need of
asylum.4 7
42. K. BOYLE, supra note 16, at 57.
43. D. WALSH, supra note 27, at 99.
44. Id. at 97.
45. Id. Although the theory of case-hardening has been attacked, and the decreasing rate
of acquittals in Diplock courts attributed to improved police success in securing confessions in
the interrogation room, Walsh correctly points out that "[e]ven if this alternative theory is
correct it does not mean that an accused is unfairly prejudiced any less by the absence of a jury
in the Diplock courts." Id.
46. Note, Extradition Reform: The Role of the Judiciary in Protecting the Rights of a
Requested Individual, 9 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 293, 297 (1986).
47. Id.
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For these reasons, the Jay Treaty of 1794 between the United States
and Britain was restricted to the return of persons accused of murder or
forgery. 4s Nevertheless, in 1799, when one Jonathan Robins was extra-
dited to Great Britain pursuant to this treaty for a murder allegedly com-
mitted aboard a British naval vessel,49 an extraordinary national outcry
arose.
50
This case planted the seeds for the political offense exception, which
Judge Friendly recently defined:
Although the term "political offense" was not current at the time...
the argument made on Robins behalf bears many resemblances to the
political offense doctrine. In both instances an otherwise extraditable
crime is thought to be rendered nonextraditable by the circumstances
surrounding its commission and by the motives of the criminal. Signif-
icantly, in later years the Robins case came to be regarded as centering
on the political offense question.51
By the mid-1800s, however, the American attitude regarding extra-
dition began to change. This trend was the result of a growing awareness
of the need to combat transnational crime. 2 In addition, establishment
of the political offense exception rendered extradition less distasteful.5 3
Therefore, the United States began to enter into extradition treaties with
many countries.
The first full-scale extradition agreement was the Webster-Ashbur-
ton Treaty of 1842 between the United Kingdom and the United States.5 4
The 1843 extradition agreement between France and the United States
marked the initial appearance of the political offense exception, which
became a standard clause in U.S. extradition treaties.55
Extradition treaties which the United States enters are considered
self-executing. Nevertheless, legislation has been enacted to facilitate im-
48. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, United States-Great
Britain, art. 27, 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105.
49. United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175).
50. The public perceived that Robins was an American citizen who had been impressed
into the British Navy, and that the murder with which he was charged had occurred in the
midst of a mutiny or attempt to escape from the British. Id. at 827.
51. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 134 (2d Cir. 1981).
52. Note, supra note 46, at 297.
53. Id.
54. Treaty, Aug. 9, 1842, United States-Great Britain, art. 10, 8 Stat. 572, T.S. No. 119.
55. Treaty of Extradition, Nov. 9, 1843, United States-France, 8 Stat. 580, T.S. No. 89.
Article 5 states: "The provisions of the present convention shall not be applied in any manner
to the crimes enumerated in the second article, committed anterior to the date thereof, nor to
any crime or offence of a purely political character." Id. art. 5.
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plementation by providing uniformity of procedure. 6 The first United
States extradition statute was the Act of August 12, 1848. 57 The statute
itself does not include the political offense exception, but does guarantee
the requested individual a hearing, furnishing a forum for raising the
political offense exception as a defense. 8
From the time when the United States first entered into extradition
treaties, the courts were called on to determine whether a particular of-
fense fell within the political offense exception. 9 In 1852, Justice Catron
supported this idea when he said that "extradition without an unbiased
hearing before an independent judiciary ... [is] highly dangerous to lib-
erty, and ought never to be allowed in this country. ' 6 The court's role
in determining extradition matters was further reaffirmed by Judge
Friendly: "[A]lthough this statement is directed at extradition proceed-
ings in general and not specifically at the political offense issue, Justice
Catron's opinion gives no indication that the political offense issue ought
to be treated differently from other issues at the extradition hearing. '"61
Thus, the guarantee of a judicial forum to decide extradition matters,
especially matters of a political nature, is firmly imbedded in United
States history.
B. Procedure
In the United States, extradition may be granted only pursuant to a
treaty.62 Both the substantive requirements of the pertinent treaty and
the procedural rules established in the United States extradition statute
govern the extradition proceedings.63 The country seeking an individ-
ual's extradition must submit a formal request for extradition to the Sec-
retary of State, the representative of the executive branch of the federal
government.6' This request must be followed by a judicial complaint
made by the Secretary of State or by the requesting country. 65 In gen-
eral, the complaint must be supported by sufficient evidence to show: (1)
56. Note, supra note 46, at 297.
57. Act of Aug. 12, 1848, ch. 167, 9 Stat. 302-03.
58. Note, supra note 46, at 297.
59. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 135 (2d Cir. 1981).
60. In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 113 (1852).
61. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d at 134.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1982); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
63. Note, supra note 46, at 300. The United States Extradition Statute is 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3181-3195 (1982).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1982).
65. Id. § 3183.
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that the individual is the person sought for the charged crime(s);66 (2)
that the charged crime(s) is among those listed as extraditable offenses in
the appropriate treaty;67 and (3) that sufficient justification would exist
for the individual's arrest had the charged crime(s) been committed in
the United States.68
After the request for extradition has been made, the Department of
State must evaluate and determine whether to approve the request. If the
request is approved, the necessary papers are forwarded to the United
States Attorney in the district where the person sought to be extradited
may be found.69 The United States Attorney may then file a complaint
and seek an arrest warrant from a federal judge or magistrate. If a war-
rant is issued, the judge or magistrate conducts a hearing pursuant to 18
U.S.C. section 3184.70
The purpose of the hearing is to determine if there is "evidence suffi-
cient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or
convention."' 7' The primary focus of the extradition hearing is probable
cause, not guilt or innocence, because the person charged is not to be
tried in the United States for crimes he or she is alleged to have commit-
ted in the requesting country. Trial is the task of the courts of the re-
66. See Benson v. MacMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463 (1888).
67. E.g., Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 515 (7th Cir. 1981).
68. Benson, 127 U.S. at 463.
69. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982).
70. Id.
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United
States and any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States, or any
magistrate authorized so to do by a court of the United States, or any judge of a court
of record of general jurisdiction of any state, may, upon complaint made under oath,
charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed within the
jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes provided for by such
treaty or convention, issue his warrant for the apprehension of the person so charged,
that he may be brought before such justice, judge, or magistrate, to the end that the
evidence of criminality may be heard and considered. Such complaint may be filed
before and such warrant may be issued by a judge or magistrate of the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia if the whereabouts within the United
States of the person charged are not known. If on such hearing, he deems the evi-
dence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or
convention, he shall certify the same, together with a copy of all the testimony taken
before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of
the proper authorities of such foreign government, for the surrender of such person,
according to the stipulations of the treaty or convention; and he shall issue his war-
rant for the commitment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there to remain
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questing country.7 2
The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure do not apply in the extradition hearing.7 3 The government
may introduce hearsay as admissible evidence74 and need not call any
witnesses.75 Probable cause may be established solely through docu-
ments, affidavits, and depositions.76 On the other hand, the defendant
(the requested individual) may not present exculpatory evidence. 77 The
defense may offer only evidence that (1) tends to explain the circum-
stances of the offense; (2) shows that he or she is not the person sought by
the requesting country; or (3) establishes the elements of the political
offense exception.78
If the magistrate determines that an offense charged is subject to the
provisions of the treaty and that there is probable cause to believe that
the requested individual committed the crime charged, the magistrate
must certify the matter to the Secretary of State for extradition. 79 At this
stage of the proceeding, the Secretary of State has the option to review
the magistrate's decision to assure that the treaty requirements have been
met. 0 In deciding whether to permit or deny extradition, the Secretary
may exercise broad discretion in considering a variety of technical, polit-
ical, or humanitarian factors.8 " In exercising this discretion, the Secre-
tary may rely on the record of the lower court proceeding or may
conduct a de novo examination of the issues.8 2
If the magistrate determines either that the offense charged is not
within the ambit of the treaty or that probable cause does not exist, the
magistrate may not certify the matter to the Secretary of State for extra-
dition. In such a situation, the Secretary has no authority to appeal or
alter the verdict of the magistrate.8 3 However, the magistrate's decision
72. Eg., Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1102 & n.10 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 1036, cert. denied sub nom. Castillo v. Forsht, 450 U.S. 922 (1980), reh'g denied sub
non. Castillo v. Forsht, 451 U.S. 934 (1981); Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 556 (5th
Cir. 1962).
73. FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1981).
74. Escobedo, 623 F.2d at 1102 n.10.
75. See Simmons v. Braun, 627 F.2d 635, 636 (2d Cir. 1980).
76. See 18 U.S.C. § 3190 (1982).
77. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 511 (7th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted); United States ex
rel. Petrushansky v. Marasco, 325 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952,
reh'g denied, 377 U.S. 920 (1964) (citations omitted).
78. See, e.g., Eain v. Adams, 529 F. Supp. 685, 687 (D. Ill. 1980).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982).
80. See Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289-90 (1901).
81. See Note, Executive Discretion in Extraditon, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1313, 1328 (1962).
82. Id.
83. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1981).
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is not res judicata: the requesting state may refile an extradition request
before a different magistrate if dissatisfied with the denial.8 4
The United States statute which governs extradition contains no
provision for direct appeal of the magistrate's decision by either the de-
fendant or the government. The defendant, however, may seek a petition
of habeas corpus in the district court, whose determination is subject to
appeal.8 5 At first, the scope of review on appeal was limited to jurisdic-
tional questions, the existence of a valid treaty, and the identification of
the defendant. However, the scope has been broadened to include at-
tacks on the constitutionality of the United States government's conduct
in the extradition proceedings. Review of any matters not within the
above mentioned scope is subject to the discretion of the Secretary of
State.86
IV. THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION
A. Background
Traditionally, the political offense87 concept has been applied to two
factually different, albeit related, types of criminal acts: "purely political
offenses" and "relative political offenses."'88 "Pure" political offenses are
acts directed against the state but contain none of the elements of ordi-
nary crime. These have usually been limited to treason, sedition, and
espionage.89 A "relative" political offense is one in which an ordinary
crime is so intertwined with a political act that the entire offense is con-
sidered political.90 The consideration of the political offense exception in
American jurisprudence has generally been whether a particular crime is
a "relative" political offense.
Every extradition treaty to which the United States is a party con-
84. United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 495, 503 (2d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
85. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 125-30 (2d Cir. 1981).
86. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1982).
87. The political offense exception is grounded in two underlying principles. From the
perspective of the requested state, the exception permits a sovereign (1) to refuse to become
involved in the domestic affairs of another country (the neutrality function), and (2) to extend
humanitarian relief to political dissidents (the fairness function). Extradition Act of 1981:
Hearings on S. 1639 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 49 (1981)
[hereinafter Hearings on S. 1639] (Testimony of W. Hannay, Attorney at Law). See Eain v.
Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 508; Note, supra note 82, at 1323.
88. Deere, Political Offenses in the Law and Practice of Extradition, 27 AM. J. INT'L L.
247, 248 (1933).
89. Thompson, The Evolution of the Political Offense Exception in an Age of Modern Polit-
ical Violence, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 315, 317 (1983).
90. Id. at 317.
1989]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
tains a political offense exception. 91 For example, the United States and
Great Britain and Northern Ireland negotiated an extradition treaty ef-
fective January 21, 1977.92 In general, the treaty provides for granting
extradition: (1) for an act or omission which constitutes an offense in-
cluded in the list attached to the treaty; (2) for an offense that is an "inte-
gral part of the [t]reaty"; or (3) for any other offense that is punishable
under the laws of both governments by imprisonment for more than one
year or by death.93 Section (1)(c)(i) of Article V of the treaty provides
for the political offense exception: "Extradition shall not be granted if:
... the offense for which extradition is requested is regarded by the re-
quested party as one of a political character." 94
In 1986, the extradition treaty between the United Kingdom and the
United States was amended to preclude offenses such as murder, posses-
sion of explosives and firearms, and kidnapping from falling within the
political offense exception. 95
B. The Standard
1. The Incidence Test
The usual standard applied by the American judiciary to determine
whether the alleged acts of the requested individual fall within the polit-
ical offense exception is the incidence test. This test consists of a two
part analysis originally set forth in two English cases, In re Castioni9 6
91. Id. at 315.
92. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 227,
T.I.A.S. No. 8468.
93. Id. art. III.
94. Id. art. V(1)(c)(i).
95. The scope of the political offense exception in the extradition treaty between the
United States and the United Kingdom was amended and limited by a supplemental treaty,
which was signed on June 25, 1985, and entered into force on Dec. 23, 1986. 24 I.L.M. 1105-
09 (1985). Article I of the Supplemental Treaty removes certain crimes from the purview of
the political offense exception: (a) an offense for which both contracting parties have the obli-
gation pursuant to a multilateral international agreement to extradite the person sought or to
submit his case to their competent authorities for decision as to prosecution; (b) murder, vol-
untary manslaughter, and assault causing grievous bodily harm; (c) kidnapping, abduction, or
serious unlawful detention, including taking a hostage; (d) an offense involving the use of a
bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm, letter or parcel bomb, or any incendiary device if this use
endangers any person; (e) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses or participation
as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offense. Id. at 1105-
07. See generally Bassiouni, The Political Offense Exception Revisited: Extradition between
the U.S. and the UK-A Choice Between Friendly Cooperation Among Allies and Sound Law
and Policy, 15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 255 (1987).
96. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
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and In re Meunier." The first prong of the test requires the existence of
an uprising, specifically a political disturbance related to the struggle of
individuals to alter or abolish the existing government in their country. 98
The second prong of the test requires the charged offense to have been
committed in furtherance of the uprising, in that it must be related to the
political struggle or be consequent to the uprising activity.99
Analysis of some recent cases applying the incidence test reveals
that acts committed in the name of political dissent do not automatically
fall within the political offense exception. In Eain v. Wilkes, 100 the State
of Israel sought the extradition of Eain, an alleged member of the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization (PLO), charging that the defendant had set
off a bomb in the marketplace of the Israeli city of Tiberius, killing two
boys and injuring more than thirty other people.10 1 The court held that
Eain failed to establish that the bombing was "incidental" to the PLO's
objectives. The court emphasized that the political offense doctrine
should not be interpreted to legitimize anarchistic activities that by their
nature impact on the citizenry and not directly on the government. 102
A similar result was reached in Quinn v. Robinson,° 3 in which the
United Kingdom sought the extradition of Quinn, a member of the IRA,
for the murder of a police constable in 1975 and for conspiring to cause
explosions in London in 1974 and 1975.1" Quinn was found to be extra-
ditable mainly because the alleged criminal activity took place in Eng-
land, not in Northern Ireland, the place of the uprisings.105 The court
stated that "[a]lthough an uprising existed in Northern Ireland at the
time the charged offenses were committed .... the crimes did not take
97. [1894] 2 Q.B. 415.
98. [1891] 1 Q.B. at 166; [1894] 2 Q.B. at 419.
99. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149; [1894] 2 Q.B. 415. In In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149, the court
adopted the definition of a political offense as an offense that is incidental to and forms part of
political disturbances. In In re Meunier, [1894] 2 Q.B. 415, the court said that in order for an
offense to be of a political character, there must be two or more parties in the particular state,
each seeking to impose the government of its choice upon the other. H. BIRON & K. CHAL-
MERS, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF EXTRADITION 28-29 (1903).
100. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
101. Id. at 507.
102. Id. at 523. The court considered the defendant's activities as anarchistic as opposed to
those of a political dissident. Id. at 521. The court reiterated the principle expounded in In re
Meunier that an anarchist cannot avail himself of the political offense exception, because by
definition, an anarchist does not advocate any particular government, but is an enemy to all
governments in general. In re Meunier, [1894] 2 Q.B. 415, 419; H. BIRON & K. CHALMERS,
supra note 99, at 29.
103. 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
104. Id. at 781.
105. Id. at 813.
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place within a territorial entity in which a group of nationals were seek-
ing to change the form of government under which they live."' 1 6
The political offense doctrine, although never considered a tool to
legitimize heinous acts, has been successfully invoked to protect acts of
true political dissent. In Ramos v. Diaz,107 the Government of the Re-
public of Cuba requested the extradition of two former soldiers who had
escaped from a Cuban prison after having been convicted of murdering a
prisoner. '0 The prisoner had been mistakenly arrested as a Battista sup-
porter immediately after the fall of the Battista Government and the in-
stitution of the Communist regime of Fidel Castro.10 9 The court found
that commission of the alleged crime took place in the early days of vic-
tory of the revolutionary faction, that the defendants were active partici-
pants in that revolutionary movement, and that the alleged crime was
part of a political uprising." 0 The court concluded that the defendants
bore no ill will toward their victim who was just one of the many political
prisoners captured in furtherance of a political struggle'1 ' and accord-
ingly held that the alleged crime was a nonextraditable political
offense. 112
More recently, in In re McMullen 113 and In re Mackin,' ' two cases
which emerged from the ongoing struggle to end British rule in Northern
Ireland, the alleged acts were found to be within the political offense ex-
ception and extradition was denied. Desmond Mackin was charged with
the attempted murder of Stephen Wooton, a British soldier, on March
16, 1978, in Andersonstown, Belfast, Northern Ireland, the wounding of
Wooton with intent to do grievous bodily harm, and the possession of
firearms and ammunition with intent.' The Second Circuit affirmed the
magistrate's conclusion that the charged offenses fell within the political
offense exception because, at the time of the alleged acts: the PIRA was
conducting a political uprising in the portion of Belfast where the of-
fenses were committed; Mackin was an active member of the PIRA; and
the alleged acts were incidental to, and in furtherance of, Mackin's role
106. Id. at 818.
107. 179 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959).
108. Id. at 462-63.




113. McMullen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986).
114. 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
115. Id. at 124.
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in the PIRA's political uprising in Belfast." 6
In In re McMullen, the United Kingdom sought the extradition of
McMullen, an established member of the PIRA, for allegedly bombing a
British Army installation. After restating the applicable test, the District
Court for the Northern District of California found that an uprising of a
political nature existed at the time of the alleged bombing; the British
Army and its military facilities were main targets for the PIRA's activi-
ties; and concerning the crime charged, McMullen acted as a member of
the PIRA. The court concluded that the bombing was a crime incidental
to, and in furtherance of, a political uprising."1 7
2. The Test in Doherty
The United Kingdom sought to extradite Joseph Patrick Thomas
Doherty on the basis of his conviction, in absentia, in Northern Ireland
on June 12, 1981, for the murder of Captain Herbert Richard
Westmacott of the Special Air Service of the British Army, attempted
murder, and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition." 8 Captain
Westmacott died when the PIRA attempted to ambush a British army
patrol." 9 Doherty was also charged with offenses allegedly committed in
the course of his escape from H.M. Prison in Belfast on June 10, 1981.120
The District Court for the Southern District of New York denied
the request for extradition on the ground that Doherty's case presented
"the assertion of the political offense exception in its most classic
form."12 While acknowledging the incidence test as a prerequisite to the
political offense exception analysis, Judge Sprizzo applied a more strin-
gent and detailed test. To take cognizance of "the realities of the modern
world" '122 and "the lessons of recent history," '123 he held that a proper
analysis must balance all of the following factors: (1) the nature of the
act; (2) the context in which it is committed; (3) the nature of the organi-
zation on whose behalf it is committed; and (4) the particularized cir-
cumstances of the place where the act takes place. 124
116. Id at 125. Although the Government did appeal the decision of the magistrate, the
Second Circuit found the magistrate's decision not to extradite was not subject to judicial
appeal. Id. at 130.
117. Id.
118. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
119. Id.
120. Ird.
121. Id. at 276.




Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
This balancing test constitutes the most elastic standard yet to be
applied in determining whether particular acts fall within the political
offense exception. By allowing the court to balance the most relevant
factors, the test provides the judiciary with a meaningful test by which to
determine whether an act is actually committed in the name of political
dissent.
V. TOWARD AN AFFIRMATIVE JUDICIAL DUTY
Although extradition cases are closely scrutinized by a judge or
magistrate to determine whether the facts fall within the political offense
exception, the determination ultimately remains subject to political con-,
siderations. In fact, in most extradition cases, foreign policy considera-
tions are the sole determinants in the decision whether to extradite.125
When the political offense exception is considered and found not to ap-
ply, the Secretary of State may permit or deny extradition on any reason-
able ground within his discretion. Even if the political offense exception
is found to apply, the requesting state can still refile, thereby encouraging
magistrate shopping.126
A. The Erosion of the Rule of Non-Inquiry
Although Judge Sprizzo's balancing test in Doherty is much more
comprehensive than the incidence test, it still does not represent the
trend, recognized by recent cases and new treaties, toward more active
protection of basic human rights.127 United States courts have tradition-
ally deferred to the Secretary of State's discretion in making the final
determination whether to extradite, including consideration of the proce-
dure or treatment which awaits an individual upon rendition. 128 This
practice has been termed the "rule of non-inquiry." 12  Recently, how-
125. Note, supra note 46, at 293-94. See generally Anderson, Protecting the Rights of the
Requested Person in Extradition Proceedings: An Argument for a Humanitarian Exception, in
TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 153, 163-65 (Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal
Stud. 1983); Banoff & Pyle, "To Surrender Political Offenders": The Political Offense Excep-
tion to Extradition in United States Law, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & POL. 169, 172 (1984).
126. See supra note 84 and dccompanying text.
127. "[W]idespread violations of individual rights perpetrated during [World War Ill
awakened international interest in defining basic human rights and designing ways to protect
them." Note, supra note 46, at 299; see Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 59, U.N. Doe. A/636 (1966); The United Nations Charter, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
128. Note, supra note 46, at 303.
129. Id.
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ever, certain circumstances have led the courts to cast doubt on the con-
tinuing validity of this rule. 130 The current criminal justice system in
Northern Ireland, which denies fundamental procedural rights to de-
fendants, indicates a need for judicial reconsideration of the rule of non-
inquiry in United States extradition proceedings.
United States courts have generally refused to admit evidence of al-
leged fundamental unfairness of a foreign state's criminal proceedings as
a defense to extradition because the existence of a valid extradition treaty
presumably attests to the acceptability of trial procedures in the request-
ing state.' In addition, the United States Supreme Court, in Neely v.
Henkel,132 established that constitutional due process guarantees are in-
applicable to trials in foreign states for crimes committed outside the
United States in violation of another nation's laws. 133 As a result, courts
have considered issues relating to the legal acceptability of proceedings in
a state requesting extradition to be appropriate only for discretionary ex-
ecutive review by the Secretary of State. 134
The first unequivocal indication of judicial desire to create an excep-
tion, in certain circumstances, to the rule of non-inquiry came in Gallina
v. Fraser.3 ' After fleeing to the United States to avoid capture, the
plaintiff was found guilty, in absentia, of robbery in two separate Italian
trials. 136 The Second Circuit admitted that it was not permitted to in-
quire into the fairness of the Italian proceeding. 137 The panel, however,
confessed "to some disquiet at this result. We can imagine situations
where the relator, upon extradition, would be subject to procedures or
punishment so antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to
require reexamination of the [rule of non-inquiry]."' 138 The panel then
concluded that Gallina did not merit application of any exception to the
rule of non-inquiry. 139
The Gallina exception has been taken only as far as speculation
130. See infra notes 135-43 and accompanying text. See generally 1 M. BASSIOUNI, INTER-
NATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE (2d rev. ed. 1987). More-
over, some nations and U.S. states refuse to extradite a person to face capital punishment. See
generally id.; G. HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1943).
131. Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911).
132. 180 U.S. 109 (1901) (Petitioner filed a request for writ of habeas corpus on counts
relating to an extradition request by Cuba on charges of embezzlement.).
133. It at 122.
134. See Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976).
135. 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960).
136. Id. at 78.
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about situations that might warrant its application. In United States exy
rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler,t4 the Second Circuit intimated that an "in-
ability to assert a defense" might be such an instance.' In Rosado v.
Civiletti,42 the Second Circuit suggested that where evidence indicated
that extradition would expose the requested individual to procedures or
punishment "antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency," the pre-
sumption of fairness accorded to a requesting nation might be
abandoned. 143
In November 1988, the European Court of Human Rights consid-
ered a case involving four men from Northern Ireland who had been
arrested in 1984 and held for four to seven days, but were never charged
with any crime.'" The justices ruled, twelve to seven, that all four de-
fendants had been denied their right to be brought promptly before a
judge or judicial officer due to "an enforceable right to compensation," as
provided by clauses of the European Convention on Human Rights
which Britain signed in 1950.14 The Court did not attempt to define
"prompt", but it did hold that the British anti-terrorist laws, which per-
mit detention for a maximum period of seven days, violated the treaty.146
The criminal justice system's treatment of suspected terrorists in North-
ern Ireland warrants abandonment of the presumption of fairness ac-
corded to the United Kingdom. The ruling of the European Court
supports the proposition that lack of fundamental fairness of foreign
criminal justice systems should be adopted as a factor to be considered by
the U.S. judiciary in determining whether to extradite an individual.
B. The Affirmative Duty to Inquire
A new statutory scheme is necessary to ensure that the rendition of
140. 507 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974).
141. Id. at 928.
142. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1980).
143. Id. at 1195 (quoting Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960)). In Rosado, the
petitioners were two United States citizens who were convicted in sham proceedings in a Mexi-
can court and subjected to degradation and torture. Id. at 1184-86. The case did not involve
an extradition request. Petitioners, after having been allowed to return to the United States,
sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that their detention in the United States violated their
due process rights. Id. at 1192. The court admitted that the petitioners had a right to bring
the habeas corpus action, but denied the claim on policy grounds. Id. at 1198-200; Note, supra
note 46, at 307 n.152.
144. N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1988, at A19, col. 1.
145. Id. at col. 5; see also European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, reprinted
in COUNSEL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS COLLECTED TEXTS
(Strasbourg 1977).
146. N.Y. Times, supra note 144, at A19, col. 5. Britain has been found to be in violation
of the treaty in 21 other cases. Id. at col. 6.
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individuals comports with the United States commitment to implement
modem standards of international human rights. The United States judi-
ciary must be charged with the affirmative duty to inquire whether the
request is politically motivated and whether the person, upon rendition,
would be subject to persecution or fundamental unfairness.
As noted earlier, courts have traditionally declined to test the fair-
ness of foreign process, presuming by the existence of an extradition
treaty that treatment upon rendition would be fair.147 Present condi-
tions, such as those in Northern Ireland, belie this presumption.
The Gallina caveat indicates the judiciary's desire to engage in
closer scrutiny of a requesting country's motives and of the potential for
an impartial trial.148 Such scrutiny would ensure the protection of the
individual and advance the cause of human fights globally. Legislation
imposing the affirmative duty to inquire would ensure that the courts, as
impartial arbiters, would not allow the use of the extradition process as a
tool for human rights violations.
Procedurally, the affirmative duty to inquire would establish two
new legal defenses within the political offense exception. First, it would
establish protocol defenses, such as whether the requested individual is
sought because of race, religion, sex, nationality, political or societal affil-
iations, or opinions. 149 These defenses would be essentially the same as
those required by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 150 and
mirror those defenses considered by courts in asylum requests under im-
migration law.151
If the individual failed to prove the threat of persecution, the indi-
vidual could raise as a second defense the fundamental unfairness of the
requesting country's judicial system. The courts would then examine
whether the target individual could receive an impartial hearing upon
rendition. The House of Representatives Judiciary Committee has recog-
nized certain rights which when denied are indicative of fundamental
unfairness:
(1) the right to an independent and impartial tribunal;
(2) the right to be informed of crimes charged;
(3) the right to conviction based upon individual responsibility;
147. Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911).
148. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
149. H.R. REP. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 52 (1984).
150. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 127. The Protcol substantially
incorporates the provisions of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
151. H.R. REP. No. 998, supra note 149, at 5.
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(4) the right to be present at trial;
(5) the right to present a defense;
(6) protection against ex post facto liability or penalty; or
(7) protection against compulsory or tortured self-incrimination.' 2
The present political realities in Northern Ireland necessitate the
duty to inquire. The entire notion of extradition presupposes the fairness
of the foreign judiciary. However, the present conditions in Northern
Ireland defeat that assumption. The Diplock courts are undoubtedly a
most repressive regime, completely at variance with impartial justice.
Moreover, the United States has extradition agreements with many
nations which have been noted for their widespread and recurring human
rights abuses.' 53 This duty to inquire -would make the United States a
leader in the quest for international human rights.
In addition, entrusting the courts to examine the requesting coun-
try's judicial process would provide a public forum for this delicate deci-
sion, encouraging greater thoroughness and impartiality. The court
provides a forum removed from diplomatic concerns and dedicated to
determining truth and protecting individual rights. The court would de-
cide extradition requests as a "matter of law not of foreign policy."'
154
VI. CONCLUSION
Ordinarily, the State Department may be able to make impartial de-
cisions, but if the final decision to extradite were entrusted to the judici-
ary, it would lend an appearance of propriety and regularity that cannot
be duplicated in a purely executive proceeding. The independence of the
judiciary lends the appearance of impartiality and thoroughness. In deli-
cate situations, such as when a foreign judicial process is called into ques-
tion, the old adage that the appearance of fairness is as important as
fairness itself proves true.
The State Department clearly has more experience in matters of for-
eign affairs, yet the Department is committed to the improvement of rela-
tions with foreign powers. This commitment can subordinate individual
rights to diplomatic considerations. The international political repercus-
sions that may follow an adverse decision are a greater deterrent to the
152. Id. at 6.
153. See Extradition Reform Act of 1981: Hearings on H.R. 5227 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1982) (statement of Prof.
Richard Falk, Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Princeton University)
[hereinafter Extradition Reform Act of 1981].
154. Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 87, at 94, 112 (statement of Prof. Christopher H.
Pyle).
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executive than to the judiciary. Therefore, entrusting the executive with
complete discretion in extradition matters is "virtually tantamount to
making the rights of individuals an incident of foreign policy." '155
Under the duty to inquire doctrine, the State Department would re-
main an important factor in the process. The Secretary of State would be
required to submit to the court an opinion of the requesting country's
capability of impartial judicial process. Precedent demonstrates that
courts ordinarily defer to the State Department's expertise in matters of
extradition. 1
56
A criticism of the affirmative duty to inquire is that such an inquiry
imposes the United States judicial standards extraterritorially. However,
the inquiry would be satisfied with a foreign process which is not funda-
mentally unfair. The foreign judiciary would not be held 'to standards
commensurate with those of the United States but to a level above that
which "shocks the conscience." 157 The inquiry would therefore impose
humanitarian, not judicial standards.
Perhaps the most beneficial result of entrusting the courts with the
duty to inquire would be to eliminate potential embarassment to the ex-
ecutive branch in its conduct of foreign affairs. The isolated environment
provides a "judicial shield" which would eliminate, or at least reduce, the
potential for confrontations between the executive and friendly govern-
ments over extradition matters.
The Eain case is an example of the judicial shield's efficiency. The
potential extradition of Eain to Israel was met with strong international
disfavor.15 In its memorandum decision ultimately approving the extra-
dition, the State Department was able to point to the thorough and im-
155. Extradition Reform Act of 1981, supra note 153, at 65.
156. Reform of the Extradition Laws of the United States: Hearings on H.R. 2643 Before
the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 56, 59
(1983) (testimony of Morton Halperin, Director, Center for National Security Studies).
157. See H.R. REP. No. 998, supra note 149, at 30; see also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 172 (1952); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 273 (2d Cir. 1974) (discussion of
behavior meeting the "shock the conscience" standard).
158. See 36 U.N. GAOR (101st plen. mtg., Agenda Item 12) at 1809, paras. 57, 60, 68, 70,
105, U.N. Doe. A/36/PV. 101 (1981). The ambassador from Jordan described the rendition as
"a disgrace to human rights, human dignity, international law and moral imperatives." Id.
para. 105. The Kuwaiti ambassador, Mr. Razzooqi, introduced the resolution and stated:
"My delegation would like to introduce on behalf of the group of Arab States the draft resolu-
tion entitled 'Question of Human Rights Relating to the Case of Mr. Ziad Abu Eain.'" Id.
para. 60. In operative paragraph one of the draft resolution, the General Assembly would
"(sjtrongly deplore[] the action of the Government of the United States of America in extra-
diting Mr. Ziad Abu Eain to Israel, the occupying Power." 36 U.N. GAOR Annexes (Agenda
Item 12) at 33, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/36/L.58 (1981).
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partial proceeding Abu Eain received from the American judiciary.'59
On the floor of the General Assembly, the United States representative to
the United Nations also stressed the independent and impartial nature of
the judicial proceeding."6 By thus invoking the judicial shield, the exec-
utive is effectively insulated from adverse international repercussions.
The judiciary is, and should be, the final forum for decisions upon
individual liberties. Political dissidents in Northern Ireland have not re-
ceived fair trials after being extradited from the United States. Before
granting an extradition request, the United States judiciary should in-
quire into the fairness of the criminal system of the extraditing country.
Judge Sprizzo in Doherty laid the groundwork for such an inquiry. His
test, however, does not go far enough. An affirmative duty to inquire will
enable the judiciary to best protect the rights of political dissidents, espe-
cially when the political offense exception is meritoriously invoked.
159. See Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 87, at 133 (memorandum of decision of the De-
partment of State in the case of the request by the State of Israel for the extradition of Ziad
Abu Eain).
160. See 36 U.N. GAOR (101st plen. mtg.), supra note 158, para. 68. Ambassador Adel-
man of the United States declared: "Let me state unequivocally that Mr. Abu Eain received a
fully independent and impartial judicial review of the extradition request . .. [t]he United
States judiciary, on all three levels, accorded the defendant full, independent and impartial
review." Id. para. 70.
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